Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 18 | Issue 2

Article 3

2010

Bringing Down Brown: Super Precedents, Myths of
Rediscovery, and the Retroactive Canonization of
Brown v. Board of Education
Matthew E.K. Hall

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
Recommended Citation
Matthew E. Hall, Bringing Down Brown: Super Precedents, Myths of Rediscovery, and the Retroactive Canonization of Brown v. Board of
Education, 18 J. L. & Pol'y (2010).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol18/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

HALL REVISED.DOC

6/28/2010 2:53 PM

BRINGING DOWN BROWN: SUPER
PRECEDENTS, MYTHS OF REDISCOVERY,
AND THE RETROACTIVE CANONIZATION
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
Matthew E. K. Hall*
INTRODUCTION
In June of 2007 the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
1
No. 1. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision, ruled that the raceconscious student assignment processes in the Seattle and
Louisville school districts were not narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling government interest as required by the Equal
Protection Clause.2 The plurality opinion by Chief Justice
Roberts, Justice Thomas’s concurrence, and the dissents by
Justices Stevens and Breyer all purported to follow the principles
established by the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education.3 According to the Chief Justice’s opinion, even “[t]he
parties and their amici debate[d] which side is more faithful to
the heritage of Brown.”4 After noting this fact, the Chief Justice
then proceeded to enlist language from the Brown decision to
buttress his own position.5 Justice Thomas attacked the
* Matthew Hall is an Assistant Professor of Political Science and Law at
Saint Louis University. Special thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Laura Beth
Nielsen, and Chad Flanders for their helpful feedback and suggestions in the
development of this manuscript.
1
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
2
Id. at 730.
3
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 747.
5
Id. (“The position of the plaintiffs in Brown was spelled out in their
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dissenters by suggesting that their approach was “reminiscent of
that advocated by the segregationists in Brown v. Board of
Education” and “replicates” the arguments rejected in Brown
“to a distressing extent.”67 Justice Stevens countered by claiming
that the majority opinion was not “loyal to Brown,” and Justice
Breyer lamented that the majority “undermines Brown’s promise
of integrated primary and secondary education.”8
The Court’s ruling was surrounded by bitter disagreement,
but on one point, it seemed almost all could agree: an
appropriate ruling must not simply be faithful to the Fourteenth
Amendment; it must also be faithful to Brown. Brown’s
legitimacy could not be seriously questioned. The decision had
become more than an interpretation of the Constitution; it had
become a constitutional text to be interpreted. It had become
what some would call a “super precedent.”9
In the recent confirmation hearings for John Roberts and
Samuel Alito, Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, devoted considerable attention to the notion of super
brief and could not have been clearer: ‘The Fourteenth Amendment prevents
states from according differential treatment to American children on the basis
of their color or race.’ What do the racial classifications at issue here do, if
not accord differential treatment on the basis of race? As counsel who
appeared before this Court for the plaintiffs in Brown put it: ‘We have one
fundamental contention which we will seek to develop in the course of this
argument, and that contention is that no State has any authority under the
equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor
in affording educational opportunities among its citizens.’ There is no
ambiguity in that statement. And it was that position that prevailed in this
Court, which emphasized in its remedial opinion that what was ‘at stake is
the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as
practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis,’ and what was required was
‘determining admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis.’ What do
the racial classifications do in these cases, if not determine admission to a
public school on a racial basis?”).
6
Id. at 748.
7
Id. at 774.
8
Id. at 803.
9
The term “super-precedent” was first used in William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,
19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976).
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precedents in constitutional law.10 Following these hearings, the
concept has come under extended scrutiny by constitutional
scholars.11 The term is generally understood to refer to cases that
are so entrenched in the law and the legal culture that they can
never or should never be reconsidered or overruled.12 The use of
the term in this high profile venue raises numerous questions:
Do certain decisions truly function as super precedents in our
legal system? If so, why? Which decisions become super
precedents, and how do we know a super precedent when we
see one? These questions have sparked heated debate, both
inside and outside the Senate Judiciary Committee.13 The notion
of super precedents raises serious objections, and those who
believe that super precedents exist often disagree about which
cases belong in such a prestigious category.14 But on one point
10

See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel Alito to be
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 321 (2006) (Statement of Sen. Arlen
Specter, Chairman of S. Comm. On the Judiciary) (inquiring whether Alito
agreed “that Casey is a super precedent or a super stare decisis as Judge
Luttig said”); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts,
Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 144–45 (2005) [hereinafter
Confirmation of John G. Roberts] (Statement of Sen. Arlen Specter,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (asking Judge Roberts whether Roe
qualified as a “super-duper precedent in light . . . of 38 occasions to overrule
it”).
11
See Randy E. Barnett, It’s a Bird It’s a Plane, No, It’s Super
Precedent: A Response to Farber and Gerhardt, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1232,
1241–42 (2006); Daniel Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (2006); Michael J. Gerhardt, Super
Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204 (2006); Michael Sinclair, Precedent,
Super Precedent, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 365 (2007).
12
See Sinclair, supra note 11, at 365 (calling a super-precedent a case
that is “judicially unshakable, a precedential monument which may not be
gainsaid, akin to having the statute-like force of vertical stare decisis
horizontally”); Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1205–06 (“Super precedents are
the constitutional decisions whose correctness is no longer a viable issue for
courts to decide.”).
13
See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
14
See infra section I.B. for competing arguments about which cases
qualify as super precedents.
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senators and scholars seem to agree: if there are super
precedents in American constitutional law, Brown v. Board of
Education is one of them.15
Politicians, judges, and legal scholars of all ideological
stripes hail Brown as a momentous decision in the history of the
Supreme Court. In the words of one Court historian,
constitutional scholars have “lavished” attention on the
“celebrated decision” which has achieved “iconic status in
American legal culture.”16 Scholars repeatedly list Brown as the
quintessential super precedent.17 In search of canonical texts to
articulate the meaning of the civil rights movement, one article
begins by simply assuming Brown’s inclusion.18
From one perspective, Brown’s exalted status should not be
surprising. The decision marked a radical break from the
Court’s previous segregation rulings. In fact, in John Robert’s
confirmation hearings, Brown was repeatedly cited as a
cautionary tale against absolute adherence to stare decisis.19
Even more importantly, Brown is closely associated with the
civil rights movement, which is arguably the most important
social, political, and legal change of the last half century.20
15

See infra notes 73, 81, 84 and accompanying text.
Jeffrey Hockett, The Battle Over Brown’s Legitimacy, 28 J. SUP. CT.
HIST. 30 (2003).
17
See infra notes 73, 81, 84 and accompanying text.
18
Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights
Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 64 (2009).
19
See Confirmation Hearing of John G. Roberts, supra note 10, at 144
(statement of Judge John Roberts) (while John Roberts recognized that “[a]n
overruling of a prior precedent . . . is inconsistent with principles of
stability,” he stated that “the principles of stare decisis recognize that there
are situations when that’s a price that has to be paid. Obviously, Brown v.
Board of Education is a leading example, overruling Plessy v. Ferguson”).
20
The Court’s decision in Brown has been frequently cited as an
extremely important social, political, and legal event. See generally, e.g.,
Richard Thompson Ford, Brown’s Ghost, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1305
(2004); Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education at 50: The
Multiple Legacies for Policy and Administration, 64 PUB. ADMIN. 270
(2004); Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education:
Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334 (2004);
Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of
16
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Yet, from another perspective, Brown’s iconic status is
puzzling. The legitimacy of the opinion was seriously questioned
when it was written by segregationists and integrationists alike.21
As late as 1959, five years after the Court handed down its
opinion, a law professor speaking at Harvard Law School
questioned the principles used by the Court in its decision.22 If
Brown’s legitimacy was so seriously contested when it was
handed down and for years after, how has it become so
enshrined in the legal culture as to serve as the quintessential
candidate for super precedent status?
The questions surrounding Brown’s legitimacy were squarely
put to rest by the civil rights movement of the 1960s. To
challenge Brown today is to challenge the legitimacy of that
movement, a position considered well outside the legal and
political mainstream.23 The decision has come to symbolize the
essence of the civil rights movement that was endorsed by the
American public during the social and political transformation of
Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991).
21
See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1737, 1790 (2007) (noting Herbert Wechsler’s point that “continuing dissent
to Brown was not the monopoly of segregationist bitter-enders, but was a
serious option for mainstream professionals”); see also Gerhardt, supra note
11, at 1215.
22
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959). Wechsler questions whether the Brown decision
was based on neutral principles.
23
See Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1752 (“[N]o Supreme Court nominee
could be confirmed if he refused to embrace Brown.”); Hockett, supra note
16, at 49 (referencing “[t]he near-universal agreement regarding Brown’s
greatness and the invective visited upon those few individuals who would
question the legitimacy of the decision.” However, Hockett emphasizes that
Brown is still the subject of scholarly controversy). Several scholars have
questioned the methods and reasoning the Court employed in the Brown
decision. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, ET. AL., WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS
REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin,
ed., 2002). Nonetheless, the existence of such critiques only highlights the
almost universal acceptance of the desegregation movement Brown
symbolizes as today’s legal scholars consider how the justices may have more
effectively pursued this ideal.
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the 1960s.24 Scholars, politicians, and the public treat the Brown
decision as if it embodies the principles established by the civil
rights revolution, but this belief is deeply flawed.
Despite the common acceptance of the Brown decision,
scholars and judges differ considerably in their interpretation of
its meaning. These divergent interpretations were highlighted in
the Parents25 case. According to Chief Justice Roberts,
[i]n Brown v. Board of Education, we held that
segregation deprived black children of equal educational
opportunities regardless of whether school facilities and
other tangible factors were equal, because government
classification and separation on grounds of race
themselves denoted inferiority. It was not the inequality
of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children
on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a
constitutional violation in 1954. The next Term, we
accordingly stated that “full compliance” with Brown I
required school districts “to achieve a system of
determining admission to the public schools on a
nonracial basis.”26
In other words, on the Chief Justice’s view, Brown
vindicated anticlassification principles—the notion that
27
“government may not classify on the basis of race.”
The Chief Justice’s opinion draws on a long tradition of
cases applying anticlassification logic to invalidate racial
discrimination. This principle was first employed as early as
1886 in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,28 though for the next eighty years it
was unevenly and unpredictably applied. Perhaps the clearest
articulations of the anticlassification principle between Yick Wo
24

See generally Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1763–92; Ackerman &
Nou, supra note 18, at 63–65.
25
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 746–48 (2007).
26
Id. at 746–47 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
27
Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470,
1470 (2004).
28
118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
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and the 1960s appeared in cases upholding discriminatory
treatment of citizens of Japanese ancestry during World War II.
In these cases, the Court ruled that “[d]istinctions between
citizens solely because of their ancestry are, by their very
nature, odious to a free people whose institutions are founded
upon the doctrine of equality,”29 and that “all legal restrictions
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect.”30 The application of anticlassification
principles became formalized in the 1960s, when the Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment “renders racial classifications
‘constitutionally suspect,’ and subject to the ‘most rigid
scrutiny,’ and, ‘in most circumstances irrelevant’ to any
constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose.”31 In the decades
that followed, the Court relied on this anticlassification
framework to invalidate numerous policies extending preferential
treatment to members of disadvantaged racial minorities.32
Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Parents advanced a
strikingly different assessment of Brown’s meaning, arguing that
the decision “promised” to bring about “racially integrated
education.”33 On this view,
[t]he Equal Protection Clause, ratified following the Civil
War, has always distinguished in practice between state
action that excludes and thereby subordinates racial
minorities and state action that seeks to bring together
people of all races . . . . The plurality cites in support
those who argued in Brown against segregation . . . . But
segregation policies did not simply tell schoolchildren
“where they could and could not go to school based on
the color of their skin;” they perpetuated a caste system
29

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
31
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
32
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Adarand Constructors
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
33
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 803 (2007).
30
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rooted in the institutions of slavery and 80 years of
legalized subordination.34
Rather than articulating anticlassification principles, Justice
Breyer understood Brown as supporting antisubordination
principles: “the conviction that it is wrong for the state to
engage in practices that enforce the inferior social status of
historically oppressed groups.”35
Justice Breyer’s arguments find strong support in the text of
the Brown opinion. Chief Justice Warren’s decision firmly
embraced antisubordination principles by focusing on
segregation’s tendency to be “interpreted as denoting inferiority
of the negro group” and “generate[] a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community.”36 Conspicuously absent from the
Brown opinion is any mention of racial classification or the strict
scrutiny standard articulated in Hirabayashi v. United States and
Korematsu v. United States.
This contrast between Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and
Justice Breyer’s opinion reflects a common point of conflict in
the academic understanding of equal protection jurisprudence.
Beginning with Own Fiss’s seminal article in 1976, Groups and
the Equal Protection Clause,37 scholars have come to understand
the competition between anticlassification and antisubordination
as the fundamental debate underlying the interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause. Although some participants in this
debate contend that Brown has always stood for anticlassification
principles,38 most agree that the opinion vindicates
39
antisubordination values. On this latter reading, only years
34

Id. at 864–67.
See Siegel, supra note 27, at 1472–73.
36
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S.
483, 494 (1954).
37
Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 107 (1976). Fiss’ article posed a serious challenge to the
predominant anticlassification paradigm by advancing the antisubordination
paradigm.
38
See William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The
Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995, 997–98 (1984).
39
See Robert A. Burt, The Sit-In Cases and the Constitutional
35
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after Brown did anticlassification principles gain wide acceptance
as judges and politicians began to recognize the political and
jurisprudential advantages of accepting this framework.40
Why do judges and academics differ so dramatically in their
interpretation of Brown? If Brown’s importance and legitimacy
are so universally accepted, why is the meaning of the opinion
so hotly contested? From where do these conflicting
interpretations originate? I argue that the justices in Parents and
the numerous academics who participate in this debate reach
divergent conclusions about the meaning of Brown because
proponents of both views subscribe to a “myth of
rediscovery”—a common understanding in the legal-academic
community about the meaning of a text and its origin in our
history that is widely accepted, but is not based on historical
fact.41 Myths of rediscovery provide coherent, if limited,
descriptions of American political and constitutional
development in service of particular policy aims; however, these
myths frequently produce more confusion than clarity for
42
understanding constitutional meaning.
In this instance, the myth to which judges and academics
cling is the widely accepted notion that Brown articulates an
unquestionable principle of constitutional law, though adherents
to the myth disagree about what that principle is. In a desperate
Legitimation of the Civil Rights Act 90 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Journal of Law and Policy); Fiss, supra note 37; Neil Gotanda,
A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 47
(1991); Randall Kennedy, Commentary, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment
on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1337 (1986);
Siegel, supra note 27, at 1481; William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race,
the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 783
(1979).
40
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights
Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9,
29 (2003); Fiss, supra note 37, at 118–28; Siegel, supra note 27, at 1498–
1520.
41
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 259 (1998)
[hereinafter TRANSFORMATIONS].
42
See generally Ackerman, supra note 21 (discussing the resistance to
Brown among both segregationists and mainstream professionals).
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attempt to salvage this myth, judges, lawyers, and academics
construct competing historical narratives linking together Brown
v. Board of Education, subsequent equal protection cases, the
civil rights movement of the 1960s, and the legislation spawned
by that movement.43 Although many of these narratives are
fascinating, the perpetuation of this ahistorical myth has
hindered and confused the debate between anticlassification and
antisubordination principles.
This article argues that Brown v. Board of Education has
been mistakenly, retroactively canonized to fill the void of
judicial articulation for the civil rights movement of the 1960s.
Although Brown was certainly decided correctly from a moral
perspective and probably decided correctly from a
jurisprudential perspective, its iconic status in American law is
dependent on the myth of its role as an articulation of the
popular movement that established civil rights in the United
States. The perpetuation of this myth obscures the meaning of
Brown, as well as the constitutional principles embraced by the
civil rights movement of the 1960s; the myth forces Chief
Justice Roberts to artificially read anticlassification principles
into the Brown decision and allows Justice Breyer to
inappropriately
claim
super
precedent
status
for
antisubordination principles. I do not question the legitimacy or
value of the Brown ruling; I simply argue that Brown should not
be considered a super precedent. The case’s importance should
be de-emphasized relative to other important acts of
constitutional politics, such as the sit-in protests of the early
44
45
1960s, Martin Luther King’s I Have a Dream speech, and,
most importantly, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.46
Part I of this article begins by considering the fundamental
43

See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 21 (incorporating Brown into such a
narrative); Balkin & Siegel, supra note 40 (integrating Brown into a larger
antisubordination narrative); Reynolds, supra note 33 (incorporating Brown
into a larger anticlassification narrative).
44
See Burt, supra note 39.
45
See DREW D. HANSEN, THE DREAM: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND
THE SPEECH THAT INSPIRED A NATION 97 (Ecco 2003).
46
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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authority of the courts to interpret the constitution. The Supreme
Court’s legitimacy in handing down a controversial opinion such
as Brown rests on the notion that the Court is enforcing
principles established by the people in a process, which is
widely recognized as constitutional decision-making. If there are
“super precedents” in American constitutional law—decisions
which deserve a heightened degree of deference as precedents—
the existence of these super precedents can only be justified by
their relation to such acts of higher lawmaking. Although Brown
is frequently cited as an example of a super precedent due to its
alleged association with the Reconstruction movement of the
1860s or the civil rights movement of the 1960s, Part II of this
article argues that neither of these interpretations is correct,
because Brown was not the articulation of a popular process of
higher lawmaking. Instead, Part III argues that when looking for
writings that illuminate the meaning of the civil rights movement
in the constitutional canon, we should look beyond court cases
to other artifacts of constitutional change. In Part IV, I examine
some of these alternate canonical texts, which suggest that the
myth of Brown’s super precedent status has obscured the true
nature of the debate between antisubordination and
anticlassification principles. Part V explores the negative
ramifications of Brown’s misclassification as a super precedent.
I. DUALIST DEMOCRACY AND SUPER PRECEDENTS
A. The Role of Judicial Review in Constitutional Democracy
Establishing criteria for identifying super precedents requires
an examination of the justification for judicial review itself. The
process of judicial review is certainly anomalous in a
democracy. Why, in a system of government founded on the
will of the people, should unelected judges serving life terms be
empowered to strike down laws and practices enacted through
the democratic process? Famously dubbed the “countermajoritarian difficulty” by Alexander Bickel,47 this fundamental
47

See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
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dilemma in the American legal system has received persistent
and focused attention from legal philosophers and democratic
theorists.48 A wide range of answers has been advanced to
resolve this “difficulty,” but most of these solutions attempt to
link judicial review to a theory of constitutionalism rooted in
popular sovereignty.
Alexander Hamilton offered the original justification for
judicial review in Federalist 78.49 There he argues that courts are
responsible for interpreting and applying all laws, both those
enacted by a legislature and the Constitution itself.50 If an act of
the legislature conflicts with a provision of the Constitution, the
Constitution must be given priority because legislators are
simply the agents of the people, whereas the Constitution was
created by the people themselves: “The Constitution ought to be
preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the
intention of their agents.”51 In other words, judicial review is
legitimate in a democracy because constitutional commands
represent a more accurate reflection of the people’s will than do
mere statutes. From this perspective, judicial review is not an
undemocratic process, but a more democratic process; the will
of the people is preferred over the will of lawmakers.
The role of popular sovereignty is at the center of many
theories of constitutional law. For example, Keith Whittington
argues for an originalist interpretation of the constitution as the
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF AMERICAN POLITICS (Josephine A.
Bickel ed., Yale Univ. Press 2 ed.,1986) (1962).
48
See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978);
CHRISTOPHER EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (2007)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION]; JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW (2001); Mark Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); Keith
Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the
Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 583 (2005).
49
THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton).
50
Id.
51
Id.
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enduring embodiment of the people’s will.52 For Whittington, the
Constitution’s authority is founded on the notion of “potential
sovereignty.”53 This idea does not assume that the people would
consent to the Constitution if asked; it simply contends that the
Constitution is the last and only legitimate expression of the
people’s will until the next express act of constitutional
revision.54 Whittington calls this dichotomy “democratic
dualism.”55 The sovereign people do not always exist; they
emerge at certain times to deliberate and express their will as
constitutional decision-making.56
Even drastically different approaches to constitutional
interpretation rely on the authority of the framers for democratic
accountability. For example, Sotirios Barber contends that the
Constitution should be read through an “aspirational approach”
that is aimed at achieving the aspirations of the framers
embodied in the text to form the best possible society.57 Jed
Rubenfeld claims that constitutionalism is the practice through
which a democratic nation governs itself by making and keeping
commitments over time, despite differing preferences among
temporary majorities at one particular moment.58 For Rubenfeld,
the Constitution embodies the will of the people, expressed as a
self-commitment that binds the people because of its necessity
for popular self-government.59 Both Barber and Rubenfeld
present theories of constitutional change that permit courts to
legitimately extend constitutional obligations apart from any
popular movement. This feature of their theories separates them
from pure dualist theories; however, it is important to note that
even they reach back to popular movements for some basis of
democratic legitimacy.
52

See generally CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 48.
Id. at 129.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 135.
56
Id.
57
SOTIRIOS BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 76 (1986).
58
JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY (2005).
59
Id. at 89 (“Self-government, on this view, requires a practice of
making and keeping commitments.”).
53
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Bruce Ackerman also supports an understanding of American
government as a dualist democracy.60 However, Ackerman’s
theory differs significantly from Whittington’s because
Ackerman recognizes that constitutional transformations can
occur through both formal and informal tracks of higher
lawmaking.61 The formal track is the Article V amendment
process envisioned by the framers.62 The informal track is a fivestage process in which political elites enter into a dialogue with
ordinary people in order to reach and express a new
constitutional decision. These five stages are: (1) a popular
movement signals its intention to break with the constitutional
status quo, (2) reformers propose a specific plan for change,
(3) the people trigger the change by supporting reformers who
then challenge dissenting institutions, (4) the plan is brought to
the people for final ratification, and (5) the advocates of change
consolidate the “constitutional moment” by coercing dissenting
institutions.63
B. Popular Decision-Making and Criteria for Super
Precedents
Each of the theories discussed above suggests that the
legitimacy of judicial action rests on its connection to the will of
the people themselves. Therefore, if there are super precedents
in American constitutional law—judicial decisions that deserve
special deference from future judges, lawyers, politicians,
academics, and publics—then the authority of these super
precedents can only be justified by an especially close
connection between these rulings and willful acts of higher
lawmaking by the American people. By reframing the definition
of super precedents as judicial articulations of popular
constitutional decision-making, I develop new criteria for
evaluating which decisions deserve this special status.
60

See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS]; TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 41.
61
TRANSFOMATIONS, supra note 41, at 3–31.
62
Id. at 15.
63
Id. at 17–23.
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To begin, I should point out a potential circularity, which is
apt to appear in any discussion of super precedents. If super
precedents are defined as cases which enjoy great popular
support, then the process of categorizing a case as a super
precedent is as simple as reading a public opinion poll asking
which Supreme Court cases are most important. The definition
quickly becomes circular: super precedents are cases that are
popular; therefore, cases that are popular are super precedents.
In order to avoid this circularity we must distinguish between a
descriptive canon (those cases which currently enjoy super
precedent status) and a prescriptive canon (those cases which
should, by some objective criteria, be categorized as super
precedents). Scholars may disagree about what criteria to use,
but if we wish to pursue a set of objective criteria to establish
which cases should, or should not, be considered super
precedents, we must be prepared to conclude that some cases
currently enjoying widespread support may not qualify and some
cases may qualify which do not enjoy such support. This point is
critical to my argument. I believe Brown v. Board of Education
is currently treated as a super precedent, yet does not deserve
this iconic status.
What objective standards can we use to identify which cases
are super precedents? The use of the term in the recent
confirmation hearings of John Roberts and Samuel Alito has
prompted a lively discussion of super precedents in legal
scholarship. This discussion provides a good starting point for a
working definition of super precedents.
Michael Gerhardt defines super precedents as “the doctrinal,
or decisional, foundation for subsequent lines of judicial
decisions.”64 Their function in the law is to provide structure for
the development of law: “Super precedents seep into the public
consciousness, and become a fixture of the legal framework.
Super precedents are the constitutional decisions whose
correctness is no longer a viable issue for the courts to
65
After discussing what he calls “foundational
decide.”
64
65

Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1205.
Id. at 1205–06.
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institutional practices”66 and “foundational doctrine,”67 Gerhardt
addresses “foundational decisions” on discrete questions of
constitutional law. Gerhardt suggests five criteria for identifying
these decisions: super precedents are cases
that (1) have endured over time; (2) political institutions
repeatedly have endorsed and supported; (3) have
influenced or shaped doctrine in at least one area of
constitutional law; (4) have enjoyed, in one form or
another, widespread social acquiescence; and (5) are
widely recognized by the courts as no longer meriting the
expenditure of scarce judicial resources.68
Gerhardt offers Knox v. Lee,69 The Civil Rights Cases,70
Washington v. Davis,71 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v.
72
Sawyer, and Brown v. Board of Education as examples of
super precedents.73
Michael Sinclair defines a super precedent as a decision
which is “judicially unshakable, a precedential monument which
may not be gainsaid, akin to having the statute-like force of
vertical stare decisis horizontally.”74 For Sinclair, the main

66

Gerhardt defines “foundational institutional practices” as practices
which “have become so well entrenched in society . . . that they may be
undone only through the most extremely radical, unprecedented acts of
political and judicial will[.]” Id. at 1207–10. Examples include the practice of
judicial review established in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803) or federal judicial review of state court decisions established in Martin
v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
67
Gerhardt defines “foundational doctrine” as “the support in case law
for recognizing the existence and application of basic categories, kinds or
classes of constitutional disputes that endure over time,” such as the
incorporation doctrine and the rule establishing classical political questions as
nonjusticiable. Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1210–13.
68
Id. at 1213.
69
79 U.S. 457 (1870).
70
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
71
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
72
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
73
Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1215–17.
74
Sinclair, supra note 11, at 365.
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feature of a super precedent is its entrenchment in society.75
Accordingly, only a dramatic societal change could alter the
precedent.76 Being upheld by courts over and over again is not a
sign that a case is a super precedent, because that means it is
being repeatedly challenged.77 However, frequent citations to a
case might suggest its super precedent status.78 He suggests
Marbury v. Madison, Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,79 Miranda v.
Arizona,80 and Brown v. Board of Education as examples.81
Daniel Farber uses the term “bedrock precedents” instead of
super precedents, but his meaning is similar.82 Farber defines
bedrock precedents as “precedents that have become the
foundation for large areas of important doctrine.”83 He gives as
examples the New Deal cases upholding federal taxing and
spending programs and recognizing federal jurisdiction over the
economy, cases validating the existence of independent agencies,
decisions incorporating the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the desegregation cases, such as Brown.84
All of these authors focus on the importance of consistency
in the law and stability in political institutions. Gerhardt argues
that “[s]ecuring the permanence of some decisions extends all of
the institutional values advanced by fidelity to precedent,
including the preservation of stability and scarce judicial
resources.”85 Sinclair claims that the most significant benefit of
stare decisis is the “stability, continuity, and predictability it
75

Id. at 411 (“That some cases should be more solidly ensconced and of
more determinate consequence than others is hardly surprising. To overrule
such a case should be viewed by society as particularly momentous and hence
something to be done circumspectly.”).
76
Id. at 400.
77
Id. at 402.
78
Id.
79
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
80
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81
Sinclair, supra note 11, at 400–03.
82
Farber, supra note 11, at 1175.
83
Id. at 1180.
84
Id.
85
Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1221.
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lends to the law.”86 Farber echoes this justification.87 For each of
these authors, super precedents exist as a pragmatic necessity for
stable government, perhaps reinforced by popular support for
the decision, but not necessarily as a principled articulation of a
popular expression of sovereign will.
Randy Barnett offers a convincing rejoinder to this
conception of super precedents. Barnett suggests that Gerhardt
and Farber have committed two logical fallacies: “The first is
the conflation of the ‘is’ with the ‘ought’; the second is the
conflation of the ‘actual’ with the ‘necessary’.”88 Barnett argues
that simply because, as an empirical matter, some cases are not
going to be reversed anytime soon does not mean that they
should not be reversed.89 If there ever came a time when a court
thought it appropriate to overturn a case, the fact that it was
dubbed a super precedent in the past should not influence the
court’s decision. Additionally, even if these cases are not going
to be reversed, it does not mean that they could not be reversed.
The factual assumptions underlying the necessity of certain
judicial decisions can change.90 If these facts change, there is no
reason a case’s super precedent status—the fact the decision was
once thought necessary—should limit a court’s options.91
Barnett also attacks the justification of super precedents
based on support for the ruling in the public or in the other
branches of government: “To be sure, some precedents could be
super, in part, because they are constitutionally correct. I put
Marbury, Brown, and Griswold into this category. But simply
identifying these cases as super precedents is no substitute for
86

Sinclair, supra note 11, at 369.
Farber, supra note 11, at 1180 (“One purpose of having a written
constitution is to create a stable framework for government. This goal would
be undermined if the Court failed to give special credence to bedrock
precedents.”).
88
Barnett, supra note 11, at 1241–42.
89
Id. at 1241. (“An explanation of why a particular decision will not
soon be overruled, however . . . is distinct from an argument for why it
ought not one day be reversed when the time is ripe.”).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1247–48.
87
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showing why they are rightly decided.”92 Support for some cases
might be strong among the public and the legal community, but
if their normative value is so great, then they should not need
status as a super precedent. If on the other hand, their normative
value fails under serious scrutiny, then perhaps they should not
have been thought a super precedent under this criterion in the
first place.
As Barnett points out, the justification of super precedents as
necessary components of stability or moral imperatives in
society has serious deficiencies.93 More importantly, though,
these justifications are incompatible with the justification of
judicial review itself. We do not have the process of judicial
review because we trust the courts more than the legislature to
maintain a stable government or promote morality in society.
The legitimacy of judicial review relies on the connection
between the court’s decisions and a previous expression of
popular will. As such, a tenable theory of super precedents,
which effectively raises a judicial opinion to the level of a
constitutional command, must rely on this connection to the
popular will rather than on a theory of stability or morality. If
super precedents exist, then their existence can only be justified
by their relation to a popular constitutional movement.
Consequently, when determining whether a particular case
qualifies as a super precedent, we should evaluate its
relationship to a moment of higher lawmaking.
As such, I define super precedents as judicial opinions which
articulate a pronouncement of the popular will. In order for a
case to qualify as a super precedent, it must be the product of a
protracted political struggle that engaged the public in a period
of higher lawmaking. Like Farber and Gerhardt, I believe that
several historic decisions from the 1930s and 1940s establishing
the federal government’s authority to regulate the economy and
upholding new taxing and spending programs qualify as super
precedents. I base their status as super precedents, not on their
inherent normative value or their necessity for stable
92
93

Id. at 1244–45.
Id.
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government, but rather on their connection to the New Deal
political and constitutional revolution. However, my definition
of super precedents leads to different conclusions in many other
cases. In the next section I will consider its implications for the
supposedly quintessential super precedent, Brown v. Board of
Education.
II. BROWN AS SUPER PRECEDENT
If Brown’s super precedent status depends on its connection
to a moment of popular constitutional politics, then in order to
evaluate this status we must ask, “What constitutional decision is
articulated in the Brown opinion?” Two potential answers are
generally advanced in the literature: Brown is either the
articulation of the post-Civil War Reconstruction movement,
particularly the movement that supported the Fourteenth
94
Amendment, or it is the articulation of the civil rights
movement of the 1960s.95 I will consider each of these
arguments in turn.
A. Brown as the Articulation of the Reconstruction Movement
The defense of Brown as the articulation of the
Reconstruction Era contends that Warren’s opinion reflected the
original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment when it was ratified in 1868.96 The
originalist argument for Brown, however, finds very little
support in current literature on the Fourteenth Amendment.
Legal scholars with a wide variety of ideological and
jurisprudential views agree that the Fourteenth Amendment was
97
not originally intended to prohibit school segregation.
Alexander Bickel, writing shortly after the Brown ruling,
conducted an extensive review of the history surrounding
94

See infra section II.A.
See infra section II.B.
96
See generally Michael McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v.
Board of Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 2 (1996).
97
See infra notes 98–109 and accompanying text.
95
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passage of the Amendment and concluded that “section I of the
fourteenth amendment, like section I of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 . . . was meant to apply neither to jury service, nor
suffrage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor segregation.”98 In a
critique of Robert Bork’s defense of the Brown ruling, Richard
Posner echoes this conclusion:
[O]n a consistent application of originalism [Brown v.
Board of Education] was decided incorrectly . . . all the
clause forbids is the selective withdrawal of legal
protection on racial grounds. A state cannot make black
people outlaws by refusing to enforce the state’s criminal
and tort law when the victims of a crime or tort are
black. To the consistent originalist that should be the
extent of the clause’s reach.99
Similarly, in their revisionist history of Brown, Mark
Tushnet and Katya Lezin examine the debates over passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment and note the “numerous statements
in the debates in which proponents and opponents of the
Amendment seemed to agree that the Amendment would not
affect the states’ ability to segregate public schools; the
Amendment protected only what they regarded as ‘civil rights’
as distinct from political rights, such as voting, and social rights,
such as education.”100 Lawrence Tribe and Michael Dorf confirm
this reading: “There is very little doubt that most of [the people
who voted for the Fourteenth Amendment] assumed that
segregated schools were, at that time, entirely consistent with
the Fourteenth Amendment.”101
Michael McConnell offers an alternate view. He challenges
“the basic premise that, as a historical matter, segregation did
not violate the commonly accepted meaning of the Amendment

98

Alexander Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation
Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955).
99
Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365,
1374 (1990).
100
Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 20, at 1919.
101
LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
12–13 (Harvard Univ. Press 1991).
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at the time it was drafted and ratified.”102 Rather than focus on
Congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the
Fourteenth Amendment itself, McConnell examines evidence
from the years following passage of the Amendment to show
that school segregation was not a completely accepted part of
national life. He concludes that “[a] close examination of the
debates and votes on segregation between 1870 and 1875 now
convinces me that Brown v. Board of Education was correctly
decided on originalist grounds.”103
McConnell offers an intriguing historical perspective on the
civil rights debates in congress in the 1870s, but Raoul Berger’s
convincing rejoinder undermines his argument for an originalist
104
Because Berger’s critique
grounding for the Brown decision.
is so thorough, I will only highlight his main conclusions. First,
Berger challenges McConnell’s use of debates over the Civil
Rights Act of 1875.105 The meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment, like the meaning of any text, must be founded on
the intentions of the authors, rather than later interpreters of the
text.106 As such, the interpretations adopted by Congress in the
1870s are irrelevant to a debate over original intent.107 Second,
all the evidence from the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment supports the claim that it was intended to legalize
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and protect a similar list of specific
rights, which did not include desegregation.108 Third,
desegregated schools were not within the meaning of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth

102

McConnell, supra note 96, at 457.
Id. at 458.
104
See generally Raoul Berger, The “Original Intent”—As Perceived by
Michael McConnell, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 242 (1996).
105
Id. at 245–46.
106
Id. at 242 (“For centuries ‘original intention’ has meant the
understanding of the draftsmen, not that of subsequent readers.”).
107
Id. at 245 (“[T]he words are words of art whose meaning is
historically confined to the intention of the draftsmen, that is the 1866
framers; it cannot include later interpretations.”).
108
See id. at 247–50.
103
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Amendment.109 Although McConnell’s argument shows the
lengths to which originalists will go to justify Brown, the linkage
between desegregated schools and the Reconstruction movement
is ultimately unpersuasive.
B. Brown as the Articulation of the 1960s Civil Rights
Movement
Perhaps because arguments connecting Brown to the
Reconstruction Era operate on such shaky ground, or perhaps
because the case is so temporally distant from that period, the
Brown decision is much more frequently framed as connected to
the civil rights movement of the 1960s. In their elucidation of
the super precedent concept, Gerhardt, Farber and Sinclair all
cite Brown v. Board of Education as a prime example of a super
precedent (or bedrock precedent), and each of their arguments
hinge on the opinion’s connection to the popular expression of
constitutional politics during the 1960s.110
Gerhardt notes the strong initial backlash after the Brown
decision, and points out that the debate over school
desegregation was not truly resolved “until national political
leaders fell behind Brown in the late 1950s, particularly through
politically and socially significant legislation such as the 1964
Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.”111 As further
evidence of Brown’s super precedent status, Gerhardt points out
the importance of Supreme Court nominees accepting Brown in
order to get confirmed.112 While Robert Bork’s criticism of the
Brown decision caused serious problems for his confirmation,
Clarence Thomas did not signal any intention to abandon the
precedent.113 Then, Gerhardt segues back into a discussion of the
1960s:

109

See id. at 255–59.
See Farber, supra note 11, at 1186; Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1215;
Sinclair, supra note 11, at 400.
111
Gerhardt, supra note 11, at 1215.
112
Id.
113
Id.
110
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Nor, more importantly, did Justice Thomas suggest he
would call into question the landmark legislation Brown
and its progeny arguably spawned, including the 1964
Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights
Act . . . . Subsequent nominees, including Chief Justice
John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, have declared
unambiguously their fidelity to Brown and to the
landmark legislation, and thus the precedents upholding
them, embedding it deeply into American culture,
society, and constitutional law.114
Why is the importance of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 included in an analysis of Brown?
What relevance do these acts have in establishing Brown as a
super precedent? The only plausible explanation for this link is
the claim that “Brown and its progeny arguably spawned” the
civil rights legislation of the 1960s.115 Gerhardt is not so subtly
implying that Brown’s super precedent status is, at least in part,
dependent on the popular endorsement of its principles in the
following decade.
Michael Sinclair echoes the importance of popular support
for identifying a super precedent.116 Although Sinclair does not
go into great detail in asserting that Brown deserves this status,
perhaps assuming the claim is not controversial, his brief
remarks highlight the importance of subsequent popular opinion
in verifying the case’s importance: “society now recognizes the
moral abhorrence of that state of affairs [before Brown], and
would surely find a return to it socially repulsive.”117
Farber firmly grounds his defense of Brown’s status on the
popular ratification of its principles during the 1960s:
Consideration of nonjudicial precedents also reinforces
the significance of bedrock precedent. The post-New
Deal understanding of federal power received the support
of the President and Congress over a long period of time.
114
115
116
117

Id. at 121–16.
See id. at 1215.
Sinclair, supra note 11, at 400.
Id.
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So has the racial integration mandate of Brown, which
was stirringly endorsed by Congress and the President in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. These actions by the
‘democratic branches’ rebuff any argument that these
precedents represent a judicial power grab, and such
actions thereby help place the precedents’ legitimacy
beyond question.118
On these points Farber is clear: Brown is both legitimate and
deserving of special deference as a “bedrock precedent” because
it stands for the decision of the people, as represented by
Congress and the president, during the 1960s.119 Without these
endorsements, Brown’s status, and perhaps even its legitimacy,
would be in question.
Even Randy Barnett, who disagrees with the value of the
super precedent concept, points out that if Brown has achieved
this status it is because of the popular civil rights movement that
succeeded it: “Brown itself did not spell the end of Jim Crow.
That took decades of political struggle and physical resistance to
accomplish, only after which did Brown itself become anything
like a ‘super precedent.’”120 Once again, for Barnett, it is the
expression of popular will through political struggle that explains
and legitimizes Brown’s importance.
As shown above, both the proponents and opponents of the
super precedent concept justify Brown’s status by linking it to
the civil rights movement of the 1960s rather than that of the
1860s. But this linkage entails several obvious conceptual
problems: If Brown spoke for a popular movement which was
yet to occur, must we not conclude that the Brown decision was
wrong the day it was decided? If the opinion’s legitimacy
depends on a decision the people made in the 1960s, then how
could it have been legitimate in 1954? Are we to believe that the
unanimous Supreme Court was simply wrong from a
jurisprudential perspective, but nonetheless praiseworthy because
the people later adopted its principles?
118
119
120

Farber, supra note 11, at 1186.
Id.
Barnett, supra note 11, at 1244.
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In his 2006 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, Bruce
Ackerman tries to resolve this temporal dilemma and salvage the
connection between Brown and the civil rights movement by
describing the decision as the first stage in his five-stage process
of constitutional transformation.121 Ackerman agrees with
Brown’s super precedent status and that “Brown’s canonization
is itself a product of the very same popular sovereignty dynamic
that gave us the landmark [Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting
Rights Act of 1965].”122 He contends that the Brown decision
was the “signal” of the civil rights constitutional movement,
which “forced the question of equality onto the center of the
constitutional stage,” by “catalyz[ing] an escalating debate that
ultimately penetrated the nation’s workplaces and churches,
breakfast tables and barrooms, in a way that is rare in
America . . . .”123
At first, Ackerman’s claim appears plausible; however, upon
closer reflection it is inconsistent with his own theory of
constitutional signaling. In Ackerman’s We the People:
Foundations, he describes the signaling phase of constitutional
change as an indication that a popular movement enjoys
“extraordinary support for their initiative in the country at large.
Extraordinary in three senses: depth, breadth and
decisiveness.”124 To say that a movement has depth signifies that
citizens are informed about an issue and have seriously
considered its implications.125 A movement’s breadth indicates
that it is supported by a large number of citizens.126 Although
121

Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1789. Ackerman lists Brown v. Board of
Education along with Marbury v. Madison and Wickard v. Filburn as
examples of super precedents. He reinforces Brown’s importance by asserting
that “any lawyer or judge who questions Brown’s legitimacy places himself
outside the jurisprudential mainstream.” Id.
122
Id. at 1790 (emphasis in original).
123
Id. at 1763.
124
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 41, at 272.
125
Id. at 273–74 (“I shall say that a private citizen’s support is ‘deep’
when she has deliberated as much about her commitment to a national ideal
as she thinks appropriate in making a considered judgment on an important
decision in her private life.”).
126
Id. at 274 (“[T]here must be lots and lots of private citizens who think
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Ackerman is hesitant to specify particular numbers, he suggests
that for a movement to register a signal, it should have “the
deep support of 20 percent of the country, and the additional
support of 31 percent of private citizens.”127 Finally, a
constitutional initiative must be decisive; that is, “[i]t should be
in a position to decisively defeat all the plausible alternatives in
a series of pairwise comparisons.”128 In We the People:
Transformations, Ackerman lists as examples of such signaling
events the Mt. Vernon and Annapolis conventions in which
delegates from several states met and laid the groundwork for
the Philadelphia convention, the election of Abraham Lincoln in
1860, the Reconstruction Congress’s radical decision not to seat
the southern delegates after the Civil War, and the election of
Franklin Roosevelt in 1932.129
Each of these examples fit the model of a popular movement
signaling a radical change in constitutional politics; but how
does Brown v. Board of Education fit into this framework? A
Supreme Court decision is hardly a good example of a popular
movement supported by private citizens signaling an intention to
initiate change. The justices on the Supreme Court in 1954 were
appointed by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower—
three Presidents hardly known for their strong stances on civil
rights and who were certainly not elected by a popular
movement demanding constitutional transformation in civil rights
law.130 There were no popular movements in society for which
the Court might have been speaking.131 As Ackerman himself has
argued, the dominant constitutional issue on the agenda of the
American people in the early 1950s was anti-Communism, not
132
civil rights.
Nor did the Court’s decision prompt any such movement to
that the reform should be taken seriously.”).
127
Id. at 275 (emphasis in original).
128
Id. at 277.
129
Id. at 40–49, 127, 166–73, 281–85.
130
Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1762.
131
As discussed infra, the popular movement known as the civil rights
movement did not emerge until 1958 at the earliest.
132
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 375 (2006).
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emerge. As Michael Klarman points out, the disconnect between
the logic of Brown (based on the psychological effects of
segregated schools on children) and the logic of the Montgomery
bus boycott (based on fairness, equality, and respect for adult
African-Americans in public facilities) raises doubts about a
direct link between these events, and regardless of “whether or
not Brown inspired the Montgomery bus boycott, it produced no
general outbreak of direct-action protest in the 1950s.”133 Civil
rights activism did not emerge as a significant social
phenomenon until the early 1960s, and then not because of
Brown’s influence, but because of other factors such as the Cold
War and the decolonization of Africa.134
But civil rights activism did emerge. Lawrence Benn notes
that the “sit-in” protest movement “that began in 1960 with four
students at a Greensboro North Carolina lunch counter swelled
135
to a force of 70,000.” By the end of 1960, the sit-in
movement had spread to every Southern and Border state.136
That same year, the students who led the sit-ins formed the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, which conducted
the Freedom Rides the next summer.137 In the spring of 1963
massive street protests broke out in Birmingham, Alabama.138 In
the months following, spin-off demonstrations occurred in cities
throughout the south, involving more than 100,000 people.139 In
the summer of 1963, more than 250,000 people attended the
March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in which King

133

Id. at 373.
Id. at 374–76. By endorsing the view that several societal factors
independent of Brown contributed to the growth of the civil rights movement
in the early 1960s, I do not mean to embrace the notion that “progress in
race relations [was] almost inevitable.” Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1764,
n.81. I simply wish to emphasize the importance of other causal factors.
135
Lawrence Benn, The Sit-In Cases and the Constitutional Legitimation
of the Civil Rights Act (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Journal of Law and Policy).
136
Id. at 2–7.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
KLARMAN, supra note 132, at 374.
134
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delivered his famous “I Have a Dream” speech, and millions
more watched on television.140 If there was a popular signal of
an intention to fundamentally alter the constitutional status of
civil rights in America, surely it was the protests of the early
1960s, not the opinion of nine aging white lawyers sitting on the
Supreme Court in 1954.
There is little evidence to support the claim that Brown
prompted this popular uprising.141 Michael Klarman’s study of
the fallout from Brown suggests that the decision did more to
radicalize southern segregationists and promote violence around
the issue,142 which in turn helped prompt the popular civil rights
movement.143 The Brown decision may have served as a catalyst
for the civil rights movement by provoking violent resistance,
but this does not mean it was a popular signal of constitutional
change. The ruling was neither the product of a popular
movement, nor the cause of such a movement. Brown’s catalytic
effect has more in common with the Dred Scott decision in 1858
and the stock market crash in 1929—both of which raised
awareness and provoked a public response—than it does with the
presidential elections of Lincoln and Roosevelt. Although
Warren’s opinion is distinct in that it shares rather than refutes
the progressive attitude of the movement to come, this does not
mean it was part of a popular movement that enjoyed depth,
breadth, and decisiveness in the American public.
Professor Ackerman’s depiction of Brown in the Holmes
Lectures is particularly surprising because it differs so
dramatically from his description of the ruling in his earlier
work, We the People: Foundations. In Foundations, Ackerman
140

HANSEN, supra note 45.
KLARMAN, supra note 132, at 374–77; see also Gerald Rosenberg,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN THE COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 107–
56 (1991).
142
KLARMAN, supra note 132, at 421 (“[I]n addition to radicalizing
southern politics in ways that enhanced the likelihood of racial violence,
Brown created concrete occasions for such outbreaks.”).
143
Id. at 435 (“Televised brutality against peaceful civil rights
demonstrators in Birmingham dramatically altered northern opinion on race
and enabled the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.”).
141
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describes the Court’s decision in Brown as “an intergenerational
synthesis, an explicit recognition of the need to integrate the
constitutional meaning of two historical periods in reaching a
valid judgment.”144 On this account, the Court in Brown was
trying to reconcile the Reconstruction Era commitment to
prohibit racial subordination in political life with the New Deal’s
acceptance of state intervention into matters previously left to
individual choice: “Once the New Deal had authorized the
state’s power to guarantee a retirement pension or a minimum
wage, Justice Brown’s confident distinction between social and
political equality [in Plessy v. Ferguson] was no longer
tenable.”145 The New Deal expanded the application of
Reconstruction principles into a greater sphere of social life by
extending the legitimate reach of government action.146 The
Court in Brown decided that, after the New Deal, the protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment must be extended to public
education,147 but the Court did not fully embrace the meaning of
the civil rights movement.
Ackerman’s
two
depictions
of
Brown—as
an
intergenerational synthesis case and a constitutional signal—are
not incompatible. It is conceivable for the Court to act as a
signal while simultaneously synthesizing two historical
constitutional principles, but this is not what happened in Brown.
In fact, Ackerman’s description of Brown in Foundations
explicitly rejects his more recent description of the case in the
Holmes lecture. In Foundations, Ackerman asserts that “Brown
is a legalistic effort to ‘cool’ the debate, not a populist or
148
prophetic effort to ‘heat’ it up.” It does not call upon the
country to engage in a new round of constitutional politics; it
tries to establish that the time had come for Americans to
144

FOUNDATIONS, supra note 60, at 144.
Id. at 146.
146
Id. at 147 (“The New Deal Court recognized the government as an
active contributor to the process by which groups made their ‘choices’ in
American society.”).
147
Id. at 150 (“Within the new activist order, the schoolchild’s sense of
racial inferiority had become a public responsibility, not a private choice.”).
148
Id. at 143.
145
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comply with legal principles already affirmed by the People of
the past.”149 It is possible that Professor Ackerman has simply
changed his mind since Foundations was published more than
fifteen years ago. If so, my argument is an affirmation of
Ackerman’s earlier reading of Brown in Foundations and a
rejection of his more recent interpretation of Brown in the
Holmes Lectures.
III. SEARCHING FOR SUPER PRECEDENT
The historical connection between Brown and the civil rights
movement is tenuous at best; nonetheless, the canonization of
Brown as a super precedent expressing the meaning of the civil
rights movement might be justified if the civil rights movement
vindicated the principles articulated in this decision. Did the
Court’s opinion in Brown endorse the same constitutional
principles that would later be embraced by the 1960s civil rights
movement? There are many reasons to believe it did not. A
brief comparison of the principles in Brown and those
emphasized by the civil rights movement highlights the problems
of treating Brown as an articulation of that movement. However,
such a comparison requires identifying textual sources apart
from Brown that reflect the meaning of the civil rights
revolution. Without a constitutional amendment or a
transformative judicial opinion to serve as a super precedent,
where can we turn to look for a clear pronouncement of civil
rights principles? The search for suitable texts must begin with
the legal pathology that led to Brown’s improper canonization.
Ackerman points out that the form of constitutional
articulation from a popular movement is dependent on the
150
institutional positions of reformers vis-à-vis dissenters. The
Radical Republicans wrote constitutional amendments to
establish the Reconstruction movement because the White House
was occupied by a southern Democrat; President Andrew
Johnson could not be trusted to appoint Radical Republican
149
150

Id. at 143 (emphasis in original).
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 41, at 271–73.
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judges who could write transformative judicial opinions.151 As a
result, we have no great super precedents articulating the
Reconstruction movement. Instead, we have the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.152
The New Deal Democrats did not suffer from this dilemma.
With Franklin Roosevelt in the Oval Office, they could threaten
to pack the Court and eventually appoint New Deal Democrats
to write judicial opinions upholding their landmark statutes.153 As
a result, we do not have constitutional amendments from the
New Deal era; we have only landmark statutes and super
precedent judicial decisions. Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the
Democrat-dominated congress passed numerous statutes striving
to fundamentally alter the role of the federal government: the
Social Security Act,154 the National Labor Relations Act,155 and
the Fair Labor Standards Act,156 to name just a few. In
upholding these statutes the Court marked out a decidedly new
direction for constitutional law by acknowledging the
transformation of constitutional principles after the New Deal.157
These decisions serve as super precedents because they articulate
the new constitutional meaning legitimated through popular
mobilization during the 1930s.158
Unfortunately, the civil rights era did not produce similar
super precedent judicial rulings. In the months before the civil
rights coalition in Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964
151

Id. at 273 (“The ‘court-packing’ issue looked very different to the
Republicans after the Civil War. Once Johnson defected from the reform
coalition in 1866, he was intent on filling vacancies with solid conservatives
who would invalidate the Reconstruction Acts and sabotage the ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
152
Id. at 269.
153
Id. at 272 (“Instead of pushing forward under Article Five, [the New
Dealers] could appoint a steady flow of New Dealers to the bench who could
uphold revolutionary reforms through a series of landmark judicial
opinions.”).
154
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–1397 (1935).
155
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151–169 (1935).
156
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201–219 (1938).
157
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 41, at 315.
158
See generally id. at Part III.
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and a very different President Johnson signed it into law, the
Supreme Court struggled to dispose of Bell v. Maryland,159 a
case that squarely presented the question of private
discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Bell, the
justices were asked whether sit-in protesters could be arrested
for trespassing in a public restaurant if they were not welcome
in the restaurant due to their race.160 The issue revealed a
complicated split on the Court that is eerily reminiscent of the
New Deal split. This time, the Four Horsemen161 resisting
change were Justices Black, Harlan, Stewart, and White.
Justices Douglas, Goldberg, and Brennan, as well as Chief
Justice Warren, supported extending the logic of Shelley v.
162
Kraemer, which had forbidden judicial enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants, to the sit-in cases.163 Justice Clark,
somewhat tentatively, opposed extending the Fourteenth
Amendment’s definition of state action to cover the enforcement
of race-neutral trespassing laws.164 Although Justice Clark
momentarily joined an opinion supporting such an extension of
the Amendment, this was most likely a strategic ploy.165 Fearful
that a ruling in Bell v. Maryland might doom the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Justice Brennan fashioned a compromise to sidestep the issue by avoiding a ruling on the merits.166
When the Court was forced to rule on the constitutionality of
the Civil Rights Act in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States

159

378 U.S. 226 (1964).
Id. at 227–28.
161
This phrase is short for “The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse” and
was used as a nickname for four members of the Supreme Court during the
1932–1937 terms (Justices James Clark McReynolds, George Sutherland,
Willis Van Devanter, and Pierce Butler), who consistently voted to block
New Deal Legislation. See, e.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION
AND THE NEW DEAL 19 (2000) (discussing usage of the phrase “Four
Horsemen”).
162
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
163
Benn, supra note 135, at 38.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 31.
160
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the justices split once again.167 According to Justice Douglas’s
conference notes, only three Justices supported an interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment that permitted Congress to
regulate private racial discrimination—Justices Douglas,
Goldberg, and Black.168 Some scholars claim that a majority may
have supported overruling the Civil Rights Cases and upholding
the Act on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, but, regardless of
the outcome, the split would have protracted the constitutional
debate.169 If a majority had struck down the Civil Rights Act in
Heart of Atlanta, Congress and the president may have
responded with an attack on the Court or waited to make
transformative judicial appointments. If a majority had upheld
the Act over a strong dissent it may have provided
encouragement to those resisting the movement. Either way, the
Court would have eventually been forced to write an opinion
articulating the constitutional transformation of the 1960s that
would serve as a super precedent.
Instead, the Court ducked the issue. As Ackerman puts it,
“New Deal constitutionalism came to the rescue.”170
Congressional supporters of the Civil Rights Act had cleverly
based their authority for passing the Act on the Commerce
Clause as well as the Fourteenth Amendment.171 The justices, all
products of the post-New Deal era, were willing to uphold
Congress’s authority based on the power granted in the
Commerce Clause.172 As a result, rather than a transformative
judicial opinion that could serve as a super precedent articulating
the civil rights movement’s revolution in constitutional meaning,
Heart of Atlanta turned out to be just another Commerce Clause
173
case. As Ackerman puts it, if the Warren Court
167

379 U.S. 241 (1964).
Benn, supra note 135, at 47.
169
Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1780.
170
Id. at 1781.
171
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination or
segregation in places of public accommodation).
172
Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250.
173
Id. (“Our study of the legislative record, made in the light of prior
cases, has brought us to the conclusion that Congress possessed ample power
168
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. . . had overruled the Civil Rights Cases in 1964, Heart
of Atlanta Motel and McClung would have eclipsed
Brown in the modern constitutional canon. In this
alternative scenario, today’s lawyers and judges would be
studying these cases, not Brown, in their effort to
elaborate the breakthrough principles of equal protection
and state responsibility that served as the foundation of
the landmark Act of 1964.174
But after speculating on this alternative scenario, Ackerman
fails to confront the pressing interpretive question raised by this
hypothetical and its implications for Brown’s role as a
constitutional signal: should we study Brown in order to
understand the principles of equality and state action embraced
by the civil rights legislation of the 1960s? If the focus on
Brown is simply a consequence of the Court’s strategic move to
avoid the issue, should we not turn our attention away from the
Court towards a branch of government that was willing to
articulate a new constitutional meaning? Fortunately, Congress
provided clear, substantive meaning for the civil rights
transformation in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.175 It is to these documents, not to Brown,
that we should look when searching for super-precedent-like
texts from this era.
Ackerman admits that Brown is a case of “retroactive
canonization,”176 but does not challenge the case’s status as a
super precedent. Instead, he incorporates the case into his fivestage process in an attempt to salvage its interpretive
177
importance. But again, the Ackerman of the Holmes Lectures
can learn a great deal from the Ackerman of Foundations. Just
as lawyers and scholars should be wary of myths of rediscovery
[based on the commerce clause], and we have therefore not considered the
other grounds relied upon.”).
174
Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1779–80 (emphasis in original).
175
See infra note 45.
176
Ackerman, supra note 21, at 1790.
177
Id. at 176263 (“In calling Brown v. Board of Education an
institutional signal, I take a middle path between legalists who exaggerate
Brown’s significance and political scientists who trivialize it.”).
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for the New Deal, we should be wary of the myth of
rediscovery for the civil rights movement through retroactive
canonization of Brown.
The Court did not accept the meaning of the civil rights
movement in Brown v. Board of Education; the Court effectively
ducked the constitutional issue and punted the civil rights
question to Congress in Heart of Atlanta. The Court’s clever
strategy produced a politically palpable solution, but failed to
produce a clear articulation of civil rights principles. Because
Heart of Atlanta was decided on Commerce Clause grounds
rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, constitutional scholars
have reached back to Brown in search of a more meaningful
statement of these principles from the Court.178 The fact that the
justices could authorize the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on New
Deal logic is the main reason there were no protracted legal
battles, followed by transformative judicial opinions in the
1960s; however, transformative judicial opinions are no more
necessary for a successful constitutional transformation than are
formal Article V amendments. Rather than mythologize the
Warren Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, the
search for an articulation of civil rights principles embraced by
the American people in the 1960s should focus on the protests
that signaled the coming constitutional transformation and the
landmark statutes enacted to achieve that transformation.
IV. BROWN AND THE MEANING OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
The Court’s decision in Brown followed a relatively simple
line of argument: (1) the history of the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment is “inconclusive” in determining the
179
(2) the Fourteenth
constitutionality of school segregation;
Amendment proscribes “all state-imposed discriminations against
the Negro race”180; (3) at the time the Fourteenth Amendment

178

See, e.g. Ackerman, supra note 21.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan., 347 U.S.
483, 489 (1954).
180
Id. at 490.
179
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was passed, “the movement toward free common schools,
supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold” in the
southern states, but by 1954 “education [was] perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments”;181
(4) separating out African-American students in public schools
“generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely to be undone”;182 (5) this “psychological knowledge,”
which is “amply supported by modern authority,” compels the
Court to clarify the language of Plessy and hold that “[s]eparate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”183 The central
principles in this line of argument are the importance of
education as a state sponsored activity, the psychological damage
of segregation in schools, and the imperative against state action
that contributes to a racial group’s inferior status in the
community. Were these the central themes of the civil rights
movement?
No one source can properly claim to speak for the civil
rights movement.184 There are several historical sources, though,
which shed light on the intentions of civil rights activists during
this period. For example, Klarman notes the disconnect between
the logic of Brown and the motivation of the Montgomery Bus
Boycott in December of 1955: “At the outset of the boycott,
black leaders repeatedly stressed that they were not seeking an
end to segregation, which would have been the logical goal had
Brown been their primary inspiration.”185 Klarman also
181

Id. at 489, 493.
Id. at 494.
183
Id. at 494–95.
184
In fact, my central argument is to discredit one potential source,
Brown v. Board of Education, as an accurate articulation of this movement.
185
KLARMAN, supra note 132, at 371 (“[P]rotesters . . . principally
sought an end to the humiliating practices of white bus drivers, including
verbal insults . . . physical abuse, and an enraging proclivity to drive off
before black passengers, who had to pay the fare at the front of the bus, had
boarded again at the rear . . . . At the outset of the boycott, black leaders
repeatedly stressed that they were not seeking an end to segregation, which
would have been the logical goal had Brown been their primary
inspiration.”).
182
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emphasizes the disjuncture between the goals stressed in the
Brown decision and those of the larger movement. Whites in the
1950s fervently opposed desegregation; “[b]lacks, conversely,
were often much more interested in voting, ending police
brutality, securing decent jobs, and receiving a fair share of
public education funds than in desegregating grade schools.”186
Based on this history, reading Brown as a super precedent
articulating the meaning of the civil rights movement seems
particularly troubling.
Many civil rights advocates continued to downplay the
importance of school desegregation for the civil rights movement
well into the 1960s. Consider, for example, Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s “I Have Dream” speech, delivered at the March on
Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963. The title of the
march itself points out an initial difficulty with the link to
Brown: where were jobs in the logic of Brown? Warren’s
opinion talks about the importance of education for society, the
logic of state action in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fear
of psychological harm to young children.187 How do these
themes apply to job opportunities in the private sector for
adults?
King’s speech offers a rich source of meaning for the civil
rights movement. Halfway through his speech, King summarizes
his goals: “There are those who are asking the devotees of civil
rights, ‘When will you be satisfied?’”188 King responds to the
rhetorical question with a list of injustices the movement hopes
to end: “unspeakable horrors of police brutality” against
African-Americans, the inability of African-Americans to “gain
lodging in motels of the highways and hotels of the cities,” the
restriction of mobility within the African-American community
“from a smaller ghetto to a larger one, “signs stating ‘for whites
189
only,’” and the lack of voting rights. Schools are never
mentioned in the entire speech, and the allusion to segregation

186
187
188
189

Id. at 391–92.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 (1954).
HANSEN, supra note 45, at 56.
Id. at 56–57.
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(“signs stating ‘for whites only’”) is obviously aimed at public
accommodations, such as bathrooms, restaurants, hotels, and
drinking fountains where such signs were posted. Not only was
this issue distinct from school segregation, but it was also an
injustice perpetuated as much, if not more, by the private sector
as by state actors.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 offers another description of
the movement’s objectives. The preamble to the act succinctly
lists its purposes:
To enforce the constitutional right to vote, to confer
jurisdiction upon the district courts of the United States
to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in
public accommodations, to authorize the Attorney
General to institute suits to protect constitutional rights in
public facilities and public education, to extend the
Commission on Civil Rights, to prevent discrimination in
federally assisted programs, to establish a Commission
on Equal Employment Opportunity, and for other
purposes.190
Here, we see the appearance of school desegregation as a
main purpose of the Act, and presumably of the movement
itself; however, it is listed as only one of several, and certainly
not the most controversial. In numerous areas, the act reaches
beyond mere state action and addresses discrimination in hotels,
restaurants, theaters, stadiums, private industry employment,
and union membership.191 Subsequent civil rights legislation
focused on voting rights and fair housing practices, neither of
which bears any direct relationship to the reasoning in Brown.192
Most importantly, the civil rights movement of the 1960s
vindicated a very different set of principles than those articulated
in the Brown decision. Whereas the justices in Brown avoided
language referring to racial classifications or distinctions, the
civil rights movement frequently articulated its purposes and
accomplishments in explicitly anti-classification terms. For
190
191
192

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 201(b).
See Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, Pub. L. No. 89–110.
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example, in his “I Have a Dream” speech, Martin Luther King,
Jr. proclaimed the hope that his children would “not be judged
by the color of their skin.”193 Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 defined desegregation as “the assignment of students to
public schools and within such schools without regard to their
race, color, religion, or national origin.”194 The Act repeatedly
condemns actions taken which “discriminate,” “exclude,”
“limit, segregate, or classify” “on account” of race, “by reason
of race,” “because of race,” “on the ground of race,” “based on
race,” or “on the basis of race.”195 The Act makes no mention of
racial groups, disadvantaged or otherwise, nor does it suggest
preferential treatment for particular racial groups in order to
address their subjugated status in society.
In fact, the Act explicitly rejects the use of race-conscious
criteria aimed at promoting integration. The Act’s definition of
desegregation specifies that the term “shall not mean the
assignment of students to public schools in order to overcome
racial imbalance.”196 In the critical section of Title IV, which
empowers the Attorney General to file a civil action on behalf of
the United States to desegregate public schools, the authors
reiterated their rejection of racial balancing. The Act authorizes
the Attorney General to institute a civil action in federal court to
achieve desegregation:
provided that nothing herein shall empower any official
or court of the United States to issue any order seeking
to achieve a racial balance in any school by requiring the
transportation of pupils or students from one school to
another or one school district to another in order to
achieve such racial balance.197
These passages were included at the behest of pivotal
moderate Republicans like Everett Dirksen, whose support was

193
194
195
196
197

HANSEN, supra note 45, at 58.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 401(b).
Id.
Civil Rights Act § 401(b).
Id. § 407 (a)(2).
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critical for the bill’s enactment.198 These moderate Republicans
demanded these concessions from ardent supporters of the bill in
order to limit its impact on de facto segregation in the North and
prevent courts from engaging in racial balancing.199 Even the
ardent supporters of the bill acknowledged these concessions.200
Senator Hubert Humphrey, speaking on the Senate floor,
emphasized the bill’s rejection of racial balancing in Title VII,
which adopted similar language in regards to employment:
“Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this title,
there is nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission
or to any court to require hiring, firing, or promotion of
employees in order to meet the racial ‘quota’ or to achieve a
certain racial balance.”201 In fact, the bill’s floor managers,
Joseph Clark and Clifford Case, insisted that “any deliberate
attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a balance
may be, would involve a violation of Title VII.”202 Surely this
same logic would apply to the equally explicit rejection of racial
balancing in school desegregation. Not only does the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 fail to endorse race-conscious measures to
combat racial subordination, it was construed by its proponents
to forbid such a practice.
V. THE MALADIES OF MYTH
In this article, I have tried to demonstrate that the
canonization of Brown as a super precedent lacks democratic
legitimacy, misrepresents history, and reduces the meaning of
the civil rights movement to state action in elementary and
secondary education. However, the implications of Brown’s
mistaken canonization extend well beyond democratic theory and
198

Daniel B. Rodriquez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political
Theory of Legislative History: New Perspective on the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and its Interpretation, 151 U. PENN. L. REV. 1417, 1474–94 (2003).
199
Id. at 1488.
200
HIGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960–1972, 85 (1990).
201
Id at 150.
202
Id at 150–51.
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historical accuracy. By accepting the myth of rediscovery that
enshrines Brown in our constitutional discourse we do not
simply misinterpret history; we misinterpret the meaning of the
constitutional decision made by the American people during the
1960s. Disentangling the principles articulated in Brown from
those endorsed by the civil rights movement sheds light on the
fundamental debate that has defined equal protection
jurisprudence for the last four decades: anticlassification versus
antisubordination.
The arguments advanced by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Breyer in Parents v. Seattle are hampered and confused by their
mutual acceptance of Brown’s super precedent status.203 Chief
Justice Roberts works diligently in his opinion to link
anticlassification principles to the Brown decision, but this effort
is ultimately fruitless because it is ahistorical.204 The principles to
which the Chief Justice subscribes were not established in Brown
v. Board of Education; they were established through a process
of constitutional deliberation beginning with the sit-in protests of
the early 1960s and culminating in the passage of the landmark
statutes securing basic civil rights. As anticlassification
principles garnered the support of the American people, courts
began to reframe equal protection jurisprudence to reflect those
values.205 By the 1970s anticlassification became the dominant
framework for applying the Equal Protection Clause.206 Despite
gaining popular endorsement of anticlassification values,
adherents to these principles have tried to recast the meaning of
Brown in order to harmonize the myth of its super precedent
status with the anticlassification agenda.
Justice Breyer’s depiction of Brown’s meaning is more
historically accurate and textually faithful; however, Justice
Breyer’s opinion simply props up the myth of Brown in order to
203

See supra notes 25–35 and accompanying text.
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 746–47 (2007).
205
See generally Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402–04 (1964);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 190–92, 196 (1964); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 10–12 (1967).
206
Siegel, supra note 27, at 1521.
204
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support his antisubordination views.207 In so doing, he pays
insufficient attention to the act of constitutional deliberation that
ultimately vindicated anticlassification principles during the
1960s. By employing a court-centered view of constitutional
decision making, Justice Breyer is able to portray the
anticlassification agenda as an aberration of misguided judicial
interpretation rather than a popularly endorsed constitutional
principle. He is ultimately correct in arguing that Brown and
many of its progeny vindicated antisubordination values, but he
is mistaken in his implicit assumption that the Brown decision
deserves super precedent status.
The myth of rediscovery that protects Brown’s exalted status
obscures the significance of the interpretive constitutional
process at work in cases considering preferential treatment for
disadvantaged racial groups. To once again borrow language
from Bruce Ackerman, these cases are best understood as
examples of intergenerational synthesis.208 Just as Brown
reconciled Reconstruction commitments with New Deal
principles, the justices in Parents are attempting to reconcile
Reconstruction values with the anticlassification principles
endorsed by the civil rights movement.209 Rather than framing
the debate between anticlassification and antisubordination values
as a struggle over the meaning of Brown, judges, lawyers, and
legal scholars should strive to grapple with the interpretive and
jurisprudential challenge of reconciling these popularly endorsed
constitutional principles.
Adherents to antisubordination values may find this
interpretation of the civil rights movement disheartening, but
they should not. As Ackerman has pointed out, the myth of
rediscovery offers politically expedient benefits at the cost of
210
democratic courage. By obsessively trying to reinvent the past
207

See supra notes 33–35, 39–40 and accompanying text.
See supra note 144.
209
Ackerman would call this interpretive dynamic a 2-4 synthesis. See
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 60, for his use of analogous language.
210
Ackerman, supra note 21, 1803–09 (“The same disease currently
afflicts American constitutional law. Our most important fiction involves the
pervasive use of ‘myths of rediscovery’ . . . . We dishonor our fellow
208
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in order to promote modern objectives, we rob ourselves of the
most fundamental democratic principle: the right of the people to
break with the past and establish new fundamental values for our
society.211 The anticlassification principles vindicated by the civil
rights movement may frustrate the proponents of racial
balancing in schools, but a shift in focus from Brown to the
constitutional revolution of the 1960s should offer inspiration to
advocates for change across the political spectrum. Those who
hope to reshape the structure of American society need neither
reinvent history in search of precedent, nor enlist the service of
nine old lawyers. The power to change our society rests safely
with the People; this power is only obscured when we discount
the achievements of previous popular movements. In this way,
the disservice we do to history is ultimately a disservice to
ourselves.
CONCLUSION
The proponents of civil rights during the 1960s were hoping
for much more than the end of state-sponsored racial segregation
in public education, and their primary concern was certainly not
with the “psychological” effects of racial oppression.212 The civil
rights movement strove for and achieved the delegitimation of
racial discrimination that caused tangible damage to Africancitizens when we tell them a tale that treats their parents and grandparents as
if they were pygmies compared to the constitutional giants of the everreceding past. We should offer them instead a view of constitutional
development that invites them to follow in the footsteps of Franklin Roosevelt
and Martin Luther King, Jr.—to dream their own Dreams and make their
own New Deals, and to build a better America in the twenty-first century.”).
211
Id.
212
See generally GRAHAM, supra note 200 (analyzing the implementation
of the liberal agenda of non-discrimination through the recreation of the
debates within Congress and the White House); KLARMAN, supra note 132
(discussing how the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education mobilized supporters of non-discrimination); RODRIQUEZ &
WEINGAST, supra note 198 (utilizing the Civil Rights Act as a “vehicle for
considering statute making, legislative rhetoric, and the relevance of our
views to the current normative debate over statutory interpretation”).
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American opportunities across the entire society, especially in
public accommodations, housing, employment, and voting, as
well as in public education. Furthermore, the proponents of the
civil rights movement tended to employ the language of
anticlassification when articulating their goals and when enacting
these objectives into law.213 I do not mean to suggest that school
desegregation was not an important goal of the civil rights
movement. I only claim that focusing on Brown as the
articulation of that movement obscures the true meanings of both
the movement and Brown.
Brown v. Board of Education should not be considered a
super precedent because it was not a product of the mobilized
popular movement that grasped control of the levers of
government and transformed the meaning of the constitution.
The special place of super precedents in constitutional law
should be reserved for judicial pronouncements that articulate
changed constitutional meanings after protracted popular
disputes. The Brown decision is neither an accurate reflection of
the full meaning of the civil rights movement, nor is it an
historical byproduct of that movement.
By rejecting Brown’s status as a super precedent, I do not
214
mean to claim that the case was not important. Nor do I mean
213

See supra Part IV.
There are, undoubtedly, numerous opinions that signal a significant
departure from established jurisprudence, yet are not the product of a
mobilized popular movement seizing control of the various arms of the state.
In each of the cases below, the Supreme Court established a principle of
constitutional interpretation which shaped jurisprudence in a particular area of
case law for years to come; yet, for most of these cases, no one would assert
that the Court’s decision reflected and articulated the conscious decision of a
popular movement engaged in an act of higher lawmaking. These noteworthy
rulings should be taught in classrooms and studied carefully, but they should
not be confused with super precedents. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (finding an Ohio statute unconstitutional under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments for failing to distinguish between teaching a group
the need for violence and preparing a group for violent action); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a right of privacy implicit in the
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) (holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
extended to the States the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
214
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to criticize the central holding in Brown.215 My point is that
treating Brown as a super precedent undermines the conceptual
value of super precedents and the historical understanding of the
civil rights movement. Confusing a high-minded act of
intergenerational legal synthesis with the articulation of a
popular political movement does a disservice to the normative
value of super precedents; confusing the decision of nine judges
with a popular signal from a broad movement of students,
ministers, and activists does a disservice to the history of the
civil rights era.

searches and seizures); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(declaring state laws establishing separate public schools for black and white
students unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment); Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (ruling that the general right to contract and the
right to purchase or sell labor is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment);
see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (one of Ackerman’s
intergenerational synthesis cases).
215
Criticizing a case’s status as a super precedent and criticizing the
merits of the Court’s decision in the case are two very different arguments;
there are undoubtedly thousands of rightly decided cases that are not super
precedents.

